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Independence of the Judiciary for
the Third Century
Deanell Reece Tacha*
For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers... the complete
independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in a limited
constitution."1

Alexander Hamilton's impassioned advocacy of an independent
judiciary rings as true now as it did when Hamilton was attempting to
convince the people of the State of New York to ratify the new Constitution. For over 200 years, the independent federal judiciary has been a
powerful tool in guarding the Constitution and the rights of individuals.
Indeed, the principle of an independent judiciary is so strongly ingrained
in our constitutional structure that most Americans scarcely give it a
second thought.
Although the general principle of judicial independence enjoys broad
support, its definition is elusive. For members of the judiciary, the
concept of judicial independence has both an institutional meaning and
an individual meaning. In its institutional form, it is a corollary to the
principle of separation of powers. That is, the judiciary is a vital branch
of government with constitutionally delegated powers, and we must be
free to act and interact with the other two branches. Each branch must
bear its appropriate share of constitutional responsibilities and be
accorded full respect in regard to those duties.
In its individualized sense, judicial independence means simply that
a life-tenured federal judge is free from all political and other outside
* Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. University of
Kansas (B.A., 1968); University of Michigan (J.D., 1971).
I wish to thank my law clerk, Andrew Berke, for his helpful suggestions and editing
assistance on this Article.
1. THE FEDEAUS'r No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 1990) (quoting Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, p. 181).
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pressures to decide cases in a wholly impartial manner. She must
commit herself to following the Constitution, the statutes, common law
principles, and the precedent that interprets each, of them. Her
decisionmaking is limited to properly admitted evidence, constrained by
appropriate procedural rules, records, and legal principles. Prevailing
political winds have no effect. The codes of conduct require a judge to
adhere not only to the principle of actual impartiality and absence of
outside influence, but also require a judge to be free from even the
appearance of any improper influence. Thus, a judge resigns from all
other affiliations that would call her impartiality into question, divests
herself of any financial interests which would raise similar questions,
and refrains from all activity that appears to have the capacity to
influence personal decisionmaking.
Examining the independence of the judiciary and perceptions about its
erosion requires that one see the issue in both the institutional and the
individual sense. Alexander Hamilton saw it both ways. He refers in
some places to "the judiciary" as a body, in other places he refers to the
independence of "courts of justice," and he clearly points to the
importance of the "independence of the judges."2 In quoting Montesquieu, he refers to."the power ofjudging.'4 In this article, I will attempt
to illustrate some of the problems that face the judiciary in both the
individual and institutional contexts.
Before I begin my comments, however, I should admit my own biases
on this subject. I understand that any discussion of the independence
of the judiciary is self-serving to me and my colleagues and may be
dismissed on that ground. I implore persons concerned about these
issues, and particularly the legislative and executive branches of
government, to pierce the obvious personal interests of the judiciary in
protecting its independence and examine with us what it means in the
contemporary context.
My perception is that most people, including many judges, think about
independence of the judiciary in the rather simplistic form of the life
tenure protection. That is certainly one important characteristic. It
does not, however, define on a day-to-day basis what factors allow a
judge as an individual and the judiciary as a whole, to act independently
in the decisionmaking role. Life tenure symbolizes the individual judge's
ability to resist any temptation to do the popular or politically correct
thing and to conform to the case or controversy requirement and other
judicial constraints.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402-404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 1990).
3. Id.
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As I attempt to point out in this article, however, protection ofjudicial
independence includes subtle but important protections in the relationships between the judiciary and the other two branches of government.
Alexander Hamilton's discussions about the importance of an independent judiciary in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 contain suggestions of
many attributes beyond life tenure that should be protected in order to
maintain an appropriate level of independence for the exercise ofjudicial
power. My hope is that all of us will look beyond the blatant personal
interests of judges and see the attributes of independence that are
indispensable to protecting the republic and the rights of those of us who
call it home.
I.

IMPINGING ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE INDIVIDUAL SENSE

Whether real or perceived, judges experience a sense of pressure that
suggests to them that they are not as independent in their decisionmaking role as Hamilton told them they should be and as the American
public has a right to expect. I served as Chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on the Judicial Branch4 from 1990-94. Because of that
ostentatious title, I received numerous letters from judges around the
country. These letters gave me increasing concern. Thoughtful jurists,
none of whom falls within the category of those who simply seek
additional comforts or resources beyond their needs, are echoing a
growing refrain of concern about whether the independence of the
federal judiciary is being gradually eroded. The letters contain a sense
of sorrow and urgency, asking the judiciary itself and, implicitly, the
other branches of government, to consider the importance of protecting
the independence of the judiciary.
The concern on this topic reached a mild crescendo when a group of
judges from the Fourth Circuit formally requested that the Judicial
Conference, through its Committee, on the Judicial Branch, specifically
consider the question of the independence of the judiciary. I appointed
a subcommittee chaired by Judge Randy Rader of the Federal Circuit to
consider the issue. They, along with several able scholars and practitioners, looked at this question. This symposium is one of the products of
that inquiry We have all struggled with the contemporary meaning of
judicial independence. None of us are particularly satisfied with the
scope of our inquiry, the extent of our ability to analyze the question,
and certainly any resulting suggestions. We are, however, satisfied that

4. The jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judicial Branch includes addressing
problems affecting the judiciary as an institution and affecting the status offederal judicial

officers.
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the issue of judicial independence is one that deserves careful consideration and thought, giving emphasis to Hamilton's statement about its
importance and trying to place its value into the context of the federal
government that we know today.
I do not pretend with this essay to evaluate substantively the concept
or even the values of judicial independence. It is a given that judicial
independence is a good in this republic. I know that it is a value that
judges think is eroding, and I hope only to shed a little light on some of
the aspects of the concern of the judges. I know that the dialogue will
not even begin in an effective manner until the other two branches of
government are actively involved. Indeed, the question is probably much
larger than government. The issue probably also relates to the extent
of the public's understanding, or lack thereof, of why the judiciary should
be independent and even of the role of the judiciary. I have addressed
those topics in other contexts and will not attempt to do that now.' My
goal here is only to provide a rudimentary description of those factors
that may contribute to the concern of the judges with what is happening
to the principle of judicial independence.
Implicit in the definition of an independent decisionmaker is the view
that the judge is independent in her manner of carrying out her duties.
That is, the independent judge sets her own cases, controls a trial or
appellate calendar, follows personal preferences in utilization of staff,
and works at a speed and in a manner most compatible with her own
work habits.
A description of judicial independence which includes the capacity to
allow each individual judge to follow her own working habits and
preferred patterns of handling the caseload has another subtle characteristic which, on its face, implicates the troublesome area of adequate
budgetary resources. In order for a judge to handle her caseload and
maximize productivity, she implicitly must possess adequate staff,
equipment, and physical facilities to carry out her responsibilities.,
Independent judicial action requires an appropriate level of support
which allows a judge to carry out the judicial function without relying
on other entities, depending on someone else's assessment of the judge's
needs, or giving any thought in the case-deciding role to tangential
factors that might influence the speed of deliberation or the outcome.
For example, inadequate funds for jury service or defense attorneys has
an immediate and detrimental effect on a judge's ability to move her
caseload as rapidly as the litigants, the public, and she herself prefers.

5. See Deanell Reece Tacha, Renewing Our Civil Commitment: Lawyers and Judges
as Paintersof the 'Big Picture,' 41 KAN. L. REv. 481 (1993).
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Of course, these impinging factors on the independence of the judiciary
are clearly contemplated by the Constitution. Congress has the power
of the purse, and therefore, appropriation and budgetary oversight
powers over both other branches. Hamilton himself said, "And we can
never hope to see realized in practice the complete separation of the
judicial from the legislative power, in any system, which leaves the
former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the
latter."' Thus, for all of its compensation and support services, the
judiciary is dependent upon Congress to provide adequate resources for
independent judicial action at every level. As federal budget constraints
force ever more attentive budget committees to scrutinize all governmental spending, the judiciary feels its share of the impact along with the
rest of the federal government.
It is therefore important to recognize that an independent judiciary
must not be unduly restricted by the annual vicissitudes of the current
approach to governmental spending. Judges obviously cannot expect
levels of support that do not reflect attention to the grim details of
constrained budgets. However, in 1995, the judiciary is less than a fifth
of one percent of the total federal budget. The judiciary in recent years
has struggled to defend appropriate levels of support to allow the
flexibility for courts and judges to do their work without excessive
oversight.
Judges believe that we share a portion of the responsibility for
addressing the fiscal concerns of the nation. Judges, in my experience,
are good stewards of the resources they are allotted. Admittedly, there
is the occasional extravagance that naturally fuels a new debate about
the extent of oversight necessary to assure fiscal responsibility. The
judicial councils and the Judicial Conference have a laudable record in
detecting and eliminating these abuses. The judiciary has taken the
responsibility for trying to make certain that spending in the judicial
branch is directly related to a responsible, but adequate, allocation to
support the judicial function.
Congress and the executive branch, with a watchful eye, are to a great
extent the protectors of the ability of the judiciary to do the work it is
assigned. Still, the other branches should recognize that adequate, but
not extravagant, resources are imperative for judges to work independently and responsibly. The appropriations process itself demands
careful respect for the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.
For example, the Office of Management and Budget normally sends the

6. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cavey & James
McClellan eds., 1990).
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judiciary's budget to Congress without revision.7 Congress no doubt
must look carefully at the request and ask appropriate questions, but
significant annual swings in the judiciary's budget have a detrimental
impact on the judiciary's ability to carry forward the tasks that it is
assigned. Although in the past decade Congress has generally recognized the increasing resource needs of 'the courts, depending on the
difficulties of any particular budgetary year, courts have had to suspend
civil trials and civil juries, cease to pay appointed defense attorneys, and
engage in a host of temporary budget-shifting mechanisms. The
symbolic benefits of a constant, assured budgetary level with modest
annual increments for inflation would make an important statement to
the judiciary about its equal footing and about its independence.
The Judicial Conference Committee on the Budget has been exceedingly effective in working on behalfof the judiciary with Congress and the
executive branch. One of the roles of Judicial Conference committees is
to provide opportunities for members of Congress and officials in the
executive branch to ask questions and become more fully informed about
the work of the judiciary Certainly the Committee on the Budget has
done an extraordinary job in providing this avenue of communication for
the judiciary. The obvious effectiveness of their work also suggests a
level of understanding and respect that should comfort judges about the
budget pressures that seem to haunt them.
Equitable compensation for all public servants, including high-ranking
government officials such as judges, is important for the long-term good
of the nation. Thus, the importance of cost-of-living adjustments for
judges should not be discounted. Although judges recognize that their
appointments carry with them a certain amount of financial sacrifice in
exchange for a position of great importance, judges have also been
caught by a political climate that links judges' compensation to
congressional pay. Inevitably in the last few years, political pressure
has mounted to the extent that elected officials have felt they could not
even marginally increase their own salaries or those of other highranking officials.
In 1993, at a time when all responsible public servants were concerned
about the federal budget deficit, the judiciary accepted the decision of
the President that no senior officials would receive a cost-of-living
increase. Judges demonstrated that they were willing to join in mutual
efforts to address important fiscal priorities, but in the intensely political
climate of 1994, judges again were subject to the political imperatives
felt by the elected branches of government. Such erosion of judicial

7. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1988).
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compensation will make it more difficult to attract and retain qualified
jurists.
To the best of my knowledge, judges are able to carry out their judicial
responsibilities with full energy and dedication. But the obvious concern
for the long-run is that judges be compensated fairly regardless of the
prevailing political attitude. The public perception of integrity and
removal from the political process would, in my judgment, be greatly
enhanced if judges were entirely separated from elected officials for the
purposes of annual modest cost-of-living adjustments in their salaries.
The nation is far better served by judges who are not affected in any
way, particularly in their compensation, by prevailing political attitudes
about paying elected officials.
These concerns apply with special force to senior judges' compensation.' In 1989, Congress passed legislation that requires senior judges
to be certified as carrying a twenty-five percent caseload before they can
receive extraordinary pay increases.9 The Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch drafted the proposed regulations pursuant to
this statutory requirement.
At that time, the reaction of senior judges, who were carrying an
almost phenomenal portion of the caseload of the federal courts, ranged
from saddened to outraged. For the senior judges, the change implied
that they were not doing their job. There may have been an occasional
abuse of senior judge status but statistically, intellectually, and
professionally, senior judges account for more than twenty-five percent
of the quality and capacity of the federal courts. Virtually no judge was
particularly worried about whether he or she would, at least, meet the
twenty-five percent requirement. Most were, however, surprised and
disappointed that somehow their colleagues in another branch of
government thought they were not carrying their share of the load.
I find the experience of working with senior judges both uplifting and
disquieting. What had been viewed by almost all senior judges as a
privilege has, to some extent, been diminished by the requirement of a
statistical analysis of their activities. The experience under the
regulations in the intervening years has been that the requirement is
not onerous, and the judiciary has adapted. It remains, however, a duty
which chief judges must carry out, circuit executives must quantify, and
for which senior judges must account. The irony of all of this is that the
certification process has never been used for any meaningful purpose

8. Judges may take senior status at any time after age 65 provided they have at least
15 years of service as an Article III judge. A senior judge is one who remains on the
federal bench but is retired from full-time active service. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1988).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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because no extraordinary pay increases have been appropriated since the
certification requirement was instituted.
II.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AS A WHOLE

In order to take its proper place in the constitutional scheme and be
a "branch of the government," the judiciary must necessarily act
institutionally. The federal judiciary's effort to act in unison on
administrative, budgetary, procedural, rule-making, and the host of
other non-case related activities of the judiciary is itself antithetical to
the notion of independent judges. By speaking in unison we necessarily
act as a body. The Judicial Conference of the United States was
established in 19221' and serves as the policymaking body and principal representative for the federal judiciary in the policy arena. The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts serves as the
administrative and staff support office. At the institutional level, while
the judicial branch must remain independent, it is also important to
recognize that the judiciary shares an interdependence with the other
branches to carry out our assigned constitutional functions.
Certainly in a "big picture" way of looking at the federal government,
each branch is doing precisely that. Congress is passing legislation at
an unprecedented rate. The executive branch concomitantly is involved
in executing these laws and regulating a host of activities that profoundly affect our national life. The judiciary is hearing and deciding an everincreasing number of cases. Looked at in its most elementary functional
sense, each branch is operating at full capacity, carrying out the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution.
In operating at this pace, inevitably the areas of overlap among the
three branches expand. The passage of new criminal laws requires the
building and administration of new prisons and a greatly increased
criminal docket for the courts and probation officers. Similarly, the
passage of new federal laws involving family leave, discrimination
against persons with disabilities, and workplace safety add new causes
of action for litigation in the federal courts and an overlay of regulation
in the executive branch. The list of overlapping interests goes on and
on. It is the evolution of the contemporary federal government itself
that has impinged, to some extent, on the absolute independence of the
federal judiciary. This is not a new phenomenon. Certainly the last
century has been marked by this gradual expansion of the role of the

10. In 1922, Congress created The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. In 1948,
Congress enacted section 331 of title 28, United States Code, changing the name to the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
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federal government and the inevitable impact that each branchhas upon
the activities of the other.
The most recent example of this changing federal judicial focus is the
attention that has been directed toward crime, drugs, and guns. These
policy changes in substantive federal criminal and civil law are uniquely
and exclusively within the powers of Congress alone. Nonetheless, the
passage of legislation such as the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 199411 will no doubt have far-reaching implications
for the federal judiciary. Many of these implications are matters of
substantive law. In that respect, the courts will and must follow the
directives of the legislation. Looked at another way, however, that
legislation and others like it affect not only the substantive law but the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the flow of cases to federal court.
The effect of this ever-increasing flow of federal cases has its subtle
implications for judicial independence. On a national basis, the judiciary
is required to be particularly attentive to statistical caseloads in order
to make certain that resources are allocated properly. Much of this
numerical caseload scrutiny ignores the complexity of the cases
themselves. Some refinement and greater efficiency is no doubt possible
at all levels. Nonetheless, the bureaucratization of statistical analysis
for appropriations, judge and case assignment, probation and pretrial
services, magistrate judges, and the host of services attendant to the
judicial function has an incremental, deteriorating effect on the
initiative, productivity, and ingenuity of a branch of government that
has largely been characterized by independence of intellectual inquiry,
widely-varying practices, and remarkable efficiency. Certainly the
courts, like every other governmental entity, must be accountable for
their productivity. Nevertheless, some believe the tendency to nationalize and quantify the work of the federal courts is a threat to the
independent work of the judicial branch.
The judicial docket has also been directly affected by case management
requirements, such as the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. Congress,
in considering and passing that legislation, was responding to a
legitimate public concern about delay and access to justice for civil
litigants. The Judicial Conference was apparently not, however,
involved in the discussions that led to the legislation, although the
matter was of great importance. Initially, some members of the
judiciary opposed portions of the legislation and expressed concern about
erosions in the independence of trial judges to evaluate cases, to
determine the course of proceedings, and to tailor schedules to match the
11. 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
12.

18 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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requirements of a particular case. That legislation clearly implicated
one of the characteristics that judges perceive to be an important part
of judicial independence: the ability to handle their caseloads according
to judicial docketing principles.'
In the years since the passage of that legislation, several pilot projects
and other statutory mandates have provided an array of possibilities for
courts to consider, suggesting that one way of balancing Congress' policy
interests and the high value that must be placed on the independence
of the judiciary is for Congress to suggest incentives and possibilities to
the judiciary for mutual discussion. When the issue involved is not one
of substantive law, but rather goes directly to the way in which the
courts do their business, the process particularly calls out for institutionalized mechanisms to bring the judiciary to the drafting table.
Variations in procedures and caseload management are healthy and
strengthen the federal court system. Judges and courts are allowed to
follow their preferences with appropriate constant refinement and
adoption of innovations and efficiencies without the artificial structure
that any national legislation would put on the system. Passage of the
Speedy Trial Act" may have been a necessity in providing fair and
rapid justice for criminal defendants. 5 Nonetheless, the judiciary and
Congress need to work together closely on any similar legislation that
clearly implicates the independence of judges and courts to handle their
caseload.
When Congress acts to curb the discretion that judges have historically exercised, some judges have taken the view that those restrictions are
also a threat to the judiciary's independence. Stated another way, when
Congress dislikes the way in which judges exercise discretion independently and removes that discretion, the result may be perceived as
another factor impinging the independence of the judiciary. Most
curbing of judges' discretion on substantive law issues is a lawful
exercise of Congress' legislative powers or of the President's executive
policy.
An obvious example in that area that has been the subject of much
discussion in the judiciary is the passage of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The United States Supreme Court set to rest suggestions of
unconstitutionality in Mistretta v. United States," concluding that
separation of powers fears were "'more smoke than fire,' and do not

13. Subsequently, representatives of the Judicial Conference did work closely with
members of Congress and most of the major issues in dispute were resolved.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152, 3161 (1988).
15. 1 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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compel [the Court] to invalidate Congress' considered scheme for
resolving the seemingly intractable dilemma of excessive disparity in
criminal sentencing." 7 Thus, a great deal of what is perceived as a
threat to the independence of the judiciary in curbing discretion is in
fact Congress carrying out its constitutional powers. I have great
respect for the many. federal judges who have opposed the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines since their inception. Their opposition is based
in large measure upon a legitimate concern that the best sentencing
decisions are those made by the sentencing judge who knows the details
of the case, the crime, and the defendant. Nonetheless, Congress and
the Supreme Court have spoken on this matter. But I admit that I am
not a disinterested part of that system.' 8
Curbing judicial discretion on how courts function and how judges
handle their workload is much more troublesome. Just as Congress
must operate in a world of political pressures, judges operate under
pressures of their own, largely unseen in the political process. These
pressures relate to evaluating the totality of their caseload, interacting
with other judges, serving the needs of the bar and the litigants, and
considering a host of other factors that cannot be generalized into
national legislation. Efforts to nationalize court procedures and the
speed of handling caseloads not only significantly erode the independent
activity of individual judges, but nationalize the work of the judiciary
when in fact the work varies significantly among districts and circuits.
I suspect that judges are concerned that, because they are away from
Washington, they are unable to influence those aspects of federal
decisionmaking that profoundly affect the judiciary and the judicial
function. lb a large extent, that concern is inherent in the constitutional scheme. The legislative branch particularly, as well as the executive
branch in its agency and representational capacities, are both simply
doing their constitutional jobs and thereby impacting directly the work
of the federal courts. Nevertheless, the Judicial Conference and its
committees serve as representatives for the judiciary on those subjects
about which judges can speak appropriately. On matters relating to
federal court rules, jurisdiction, caseload, and a host of other procedural
and administrative matters, the judiciary can and should speak.'
Under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, judges, and
therefore the Judicial Conference, may speak on topics related to the
legal system and the administration of justice. Thus, the Judicial

17.
18.
19.
OHIO

Id. at 384.
In 1994, 1 was confirmed as a member of the United States Sentencing Commission.
See Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52
ST. L.J. 279, 292-95 (1991).
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Conference was actively involved in disqussing the recent crime
legislation with Congress and the Office of the Attorney General. The
Judicial Conference expressed the concerns of the federal judiciary about
federal jurisdictional questions, federal caseload, and the appropriate
role of the federal courts.
In order for the judiciary to be a participant in these issues, the
judiciary must take an active role only on those topics that are
appropriate for judicial comment and refrain from commenting on
substantive policy issues which are more appropriately left within the
purview of Congress. Continuing efforts to institutionalize dialogues
among the three branches of government will no doubt help relieve a
sense of unease felt by judges that so much is "happening to them" in a
way that suggests inequality in the process. I suspect most of this is
borne of each branch carrying out its functions, but to the extent that
the judiciary is excluded from debates where they should appropriately
be involved, the independent status of the judiciary is in question.
Some judges have also observed that the law itself is being hurt by a
general lack of understanding of the federal court system, its duties,
jurisdiction, and the effects of the actions of Congress, the executive
branch, and independent regulatory agencies on the work of the courts.
This concern focuses on the federalization issue such as the trend toward
enacting federal crime legislation in areas traditionally prosecuted in
state courts. It can also be traced to concern about increasing caseloads
and the impact that has on a judge's ability to carry out her responsibilities independently and satisfactorily. Many judges worry that elected
officials, with the exception of members of the judiciary committees, do
not have experience with the day-to-day activities of federal courts. Tb
address this concern, the Committee on the Judicial Branch established
a simple, but apparently effective, program of encouraging judges and
courts to invite members of Congress into the courthouse while they are
in the district. These visits are informal. Most judges have no
particular agenda other than illustrating the judge's daily activities and
giving the members of Congress an opportunity to ask questions and
raise issues with the judges. Though simple in format, the benefit of
these meetings goes a long way in providing both judges and members
of Congress with valuable information about each others' areas of
concern.
Finally, a discussion of factors that impinge upon the independence of
individual judges would be incomplete without reference to factors
internal to the judiciary. The judicial branch itself has created some of
the bureaucracy that is seen as eroding the independence of individual
judges. Scarce resources, pressing caseloads, and a desire for enhanced
efficiency have resulted in the judiciary's reporting and accountability
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requirements that necessarily impact the way judges do their work. The
Judicial Conference makes determinations about staffing in judges'
chambers, the size of courtrooms and courthouses, automation, and a
host of other support services that directly influence the way judges
work. Much of this simply cannot be avoided. Thus, in the name of
acting responsibly as a whole, the judiciary itself circumscribes the
independence of individual judges. Judicial councils in each circuit make
decisions regarding space and facility usage, misconduct complaints,
staff, and other support services that affect the judges in that circuit.
Chiefjudges of each district court and chief circuit judges also have some
decisionmaking authority that affects individual judges tangentially or
directly. While much of this internal administration is inevitable in a
large institution with limited resources, the judiciary itself must be
careful to avoid all unnecessary impediments to judges acting independently in carrying out their judicial function. I consider it a strength of
judicial independence in the institutional sense that the judiciary
exercises such control from within the branch without intrusion from the
other branches.
III. CONCLUSION
Some issues must always be resolved by Congress as policy and
political issues. To the extent that an issue imposes on the judiciary's
independence, it is essential that all three branches of government stand
firm in maintaining the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Having the judiciary actively involved in an issue's debate and resolution
is one way to avoid infringement on its institutional independence.
Sometimes the other branches will decide not to act, while in other
instances they will decide to proceed with the policy changes. Nevertheless, the process demands mutual respect and careful attention to the
constitutional role of judges. No one is arguing for preferred status. I
argue simply for careful attention to the constitutional principle of the
independence of the judiciary as a value that is not absolute but which
deserves watchful protection.
My personal experiences confirm the need to uphold the principle of
an independent judiciary. Under the auspices of the Central and East
European Law Initiative sponsored by the American Bar Association and
other interested foundations, I was privileged in 1992 to visit the newlyestablished democracy in Albania. A small group of American lawyers,
law professors, and two judges went to Albania to confer with a group
of highly-placed Albanian judges, scholars, and elected officials on
proposed provisions for their new constitution. During one discussion
session, we focused on two proposed provisions. One provision guaranteed a classic First Amendment right to freedom of assembly and
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freedom of speech. The other draft provision outlawed ethnic minority
political parties. Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit and
I were asked what judges in our country would do if confronted with the
ban on ethnic minority political parties, assuming the freedom of
assembly provision were ratified. We declared that in the United States
such a ban would be ruled unconstitutional as a violation of the right of
free assembly. The group of Albanians looked puzzled.
The next
question with which we were confronted was: "What if the President
doesn't like it?" Yet again we cavalierly responded "tough," blindly
relying upon our explicit authority as an independent judiciary
Then came the question to which we had no answer. After hearing
these two American judges claim that the President's views would not
influence the outcome of a judicial opinion, a young newly-elected official
asked hesitatingly, "But what if the military came after you?" Judge
Higginbotham and I looked at each other with the unspoken knowledge
that we had no answer to that question. We quickly realized that we
had never been forced to consider that question. In that moment, both
of us experienced a new appreciation for the history and tradition of a
judiciary where judges need not. fret over the personal physical
repercussions of a particular decision. We could not answer the
Albanian official's question except with the most feeble speculation. Our
questioners knew firsthand the reality of a government where there was
not an independent judiciary.
We learned a lesson which will remain an intellectual sentinel
guarding my understanding of the continued vitality of Montesquieu's
and Hamilton's insistence upon an independent judiciary for a free
people. As Hamilton said,
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
coDjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
and which, though they speedily give place to better information and
more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the meantime to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government,
and serious oppressions of
2
the minority party in the community. 1
I find guidance in Hamilton's words. Everything we hear and read,
and indeed experience, tells us that the public level of confidence in
government and public servants is at a low ebb. Thus, no matter what
our role is in this constitutional scheme, Hamilton's words never rang

20. Tmz FEDERALisT No. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 1990).
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more true than when he pointed to the importance of any mechanism
that will play a role in reversing public mistrust and the perception of
political maneuvering. Ifcarefully guarded, the constitutional protection
of an independent judiciary is one such mechanism. In my view, it has
never been more important to all three branches for the public to feel
confident that the judiciary is independently pursuing its appropriate
constitutional role. Thus, a renewed focus on the meaning of an
independent judiciary is important to defining its scope, protecting its
integrity, and charting a future course for the relationship between the
judiciary and the two elected branches of government.

